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Voluntarism





1 The relation between (German) Idealism and (American) Pragmatism is complex, as both
are  better  seen  as  traditions  with  their  own  internal  tensions  or  even  outright
contradictions rather  than  fully-codified  sets  of  doctrines.  This  is  obvious  from the
debates between Left and Right Wing Hegelians, or from Peirce’s famous re-christening of
his position as pragmaticism, “[…] which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers” (CP
5.414).  I  put  the  demonyms  in  parentheses  because,  while  the  founders  and  key
proponents were German or American, each were international movements. For example,
the American William Torrey Harris, Brit Francis Herbert Bradley, and Italian Benedetto
Croce, among others, continued and developed the tradition of German Idealism, while
German-born  Ferdinand  Canning  Scott  Schiller  and  Italian  Giovanni  Papini  aligned
themselves  with  American Pragmatism.1 On  the  other  hand,  we  should  expect  some
commonalities  between  each  tradition  due  to  mutual  influence,  though  the
preponderance  of  influence  is  probably  from  the  German  Idealists  to  the  American
Pragmatists  simply  because  of  timing,  as  exemplified  by  John  Dewey’s  “permanent
Hegelian deposit.”2 More broadly,  we can see each tradition as  motivated by similar
concerns, such as reconceptualizing the human in light of the sceptical culmination of
modern philosophy in David Hume and the success of the physical sciences.3
2 What, then, might we say about the relation between idealism and pragmatism in light of
these  complications,  as  well  as  others  not  mentioned?4 In  this  paper  I  propose  one
promising line of inquiry into this question: an examination of the philosophy of Josiah
Royce. Royce was one of the first four philosophy Ph.D’s from Johns Hopkins University,
and trained in Germany in the 1870s. He engaged deeply with the thought of his Harvard
colleague William James and with that of Charles Peirce, as well as with the history of
philosophy and religion more broadly. In particular, in his late masterwork The Problem of
Voluntarism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-2 | 2018
1
Christianity, Royce called his position Absolute Pragmatism. This may seem a contradictio in
adiecto, but as James Cotton (1954: 11) argued “[…] the most important point […] in the
work of Royce lies in the union between idealism and pragmatism in his thought.” This
suggests at least two things. First, that, regardless of his success, Royce thought idealism
and pragmatism could be  unified.  This  is  a  small  point  in  favor  of  those  who think
pragmatism is, in some sense, an outgrowth of idealism, in that an offshoot might be
dialectically re-absorbed by the whole. Second, and this is the side I emphasize, Royce’s
efforts  to synthesize idealism and pragmatism suggests  that  there is  something right
about pragmatism that idealism lacks. And what might this be? A bit later in The Problem of
Christianity Royce (1913: 293) calls his philosophy Absolute Voluntarism:
In its most general form, this philosophy to which I myself adhere, asserts that,
while every metaphysical theory is the expression of an attitude of the will, there is
one,  and  but  one,  general  and  decisive  attitude  of  the  will  which  is  the  right
attitude, when we stand in presence of the universe, and when we undertake to
choose how we propose to bear ourselves towards the world.
3 The  “one  general  and  decisive  attitude  of  the  will”  is  the  Absolute  part  of  Royce’s
doctrine, while “every metaphysical theory is the expression of an attitude of the will” is
the Voluntarism part, which Royce says the pragmatists are right about. In other words,
for Royce Voluntarism is “[…] the spirit of pragmatism, as James defined it” (ibid.: 291).5
Furthermore,  as  Mahowald  (1972:  14)  argues,  “[…]  voluntarism  is  the  key  to  the
distinction between Royce and the speculative idealists.” Might it thereby also be the key
to the distinction between pragmatism and idealism?
4 Of course, this raises the question of the relation between pragmatism and voluntarism.
However, I think this is a fruitful complication, because it is clear that commentators at
the  turn  of  the  twentieth  century  also  thought  the  key  issue  between idealism and
pragmatism was the question of intellectualism or voluntarism. Accordingly, this paper
will now turn to a survey of Royce’s conception of idealism and the development of his
voluntarism,  especially  through  his  engagement  with  Peirce,  James,  and  Dewey.
Additionally,  we will  explore some of the authors who weighed in the importance of
voluntarism as a distinct feature of pragmatism. The upshot will be that voluntarism,
while itself a contested term, was seen as a fundamental difference between idealism and
pragmatism,  and  one  of  (semi-)independent  origin.6 While  I  make  no  pretense  at
resolving the debate about the relation between idealism and pragmatism here, I do hope
to show the promise of voluntarism as a more concrete topic for further inquiry.7
 
2. Royce’s Early Pragmatism: Correcting Kant
5 In 1881 Royce gave a talk at a Kant centennial on “Kant’s Relation to Modern Philosophic
Progress,”  published later  that  year  in The  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy.8 This  talk
comes ten years after Peirce’s early articulation of what will  be called the pragmatic
maxim in his 1871 “Review of Fraser’s Berkeley,” and three years after its presentation in
the Popular Science Monthly series,  especially “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” 9 Royce’s
address also comes two years after James’ “Sentiment of Rationality,” and a year before
he joined Harvard as a sabbatical replacement for James; for example, it includes two
complimentary  references  to  James’  concept  of  a  spatial  quale  (Royce,  1881: 376).
However, Royce’s focus is squarely on Kant of the first Kritik, rather than some nascent
form of pragmatism. The paper has two main sections: first, a survey of whether any post-
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Kantian ontology is  successful;  and second,  finding that  none are successful,  Royce’s
suggestion for “[…] a direct development of the Kantian thought” (ibid.: 361).
6 Royce sees monism, in its variety of forms, as the dominant ontology of the nineteenth
century. He quickly dispenses with both materialist and mentalist (e.g., William Clifford’s
Mind-Stuff) atomic monisms, as no aggregate can achieve the unity of consciousness:
“Consciousness, then, as a continual synthesis of innumerable elements into the unity of
active judgment is more than an aggregate, and can never be explained as an aggregate of
elementary atoms of sensation” (Royce, 1881: 364-5). Thus, materialist atomic monism is
doubly mistaken, for it also cannot explain the origin of mind. As atomism fails, he turns
to “[…] the numerous efforts that see in the world the expression of psychical powers as
such, not mere mind-stuff atoms, but organized wholes […]” (ibid.: 366). Again, he sees
two broad classes of monism: Logical and Alogical. Hegel exemplifies the former, though
he goes  unnamed here,  as  the  Panlogical Monist,  who “[…]  conceives  the  world  as  a
process whereby the world-spirit makes actual what was potential, and the world-history
therefore as an Evolution” (ibid.). Why must there be evolution, though? Why does the
Logos not simply actualize the perfection it already contains? Furthermore, there is the
pessimistic  critique of  Schopenhauer’s  Alogical monism,  wherein despite  its  evolution
towards perfection the world is  almost  wholly marked by imperfection:  “We mortals
know of no one point in the universe where one might lay his hand and say: Here the ideal
is attained” (ibid.: 368). However, Royce dismisses Schopenhauer’s Alogical Monism even
more swiftly, as he think it lacks even a consistent statement.10 Here I take Royce to mean
not a particular failure of Schopenhauer’s writing, but rather the general difficulty in
articulating rational claims about the irrationality of everything. Thus, for Royce Alogical
Monism is a non-starter, while Panlogical Monism faces difficulties further down the line.
7 Even  if  a  version  of  Panlogical  Monism  could  be  established  that  is  not  internally
inconsistent, “[…] the terrible passage through the gates of the Kantian Dialektik would
remain for  each […]  The great  problems of  the  theory  of  knowledge would demand
solution” (Royce, 1881: 370). Kant’s solution is unsatisfactory, for commonly expressed
reasons  (e.g.,  the  particulars  of  the  relation  between  the  form  and  matter  of
appearances), and so Royce (ibid.: 378) offers his own modification of Kantianism:
The view here maintained is that the past data, instead of being picked up, as it
were, by the synthesis of apprehension and recognition, and carried bodily into the
present  consciousness,  are really  projected  out  of  the  present  data,  into  the
conceived past, by the momentary activity of judgment […] Our view would make
all the world of reality immediately subject to a unity implied in the present act by
which  this  world  is  projected  from the  present  into  a  conceived  but  not  given
infinite space and time.
8 Royce  distinguishes  three  classes  of  conscious  acts  of  projection  from present  data:
Acknowledgement of the Past, Anticipations (of the future), and Acknowledgement of a
Universe of Truth (reference to external reality and other minds).  Understanding the
past,  future,  and  external  reality  as  a  projection  from  present  data  by  an  act  of
consciousness eliminates “[t]he three imposters of the Kantian Kritik (imposters because
they  so  well  deceived  Kant  himself),  whose  names  are  Ding  an  sich,  transcendentaler
Gegenstand, and Noumenon” (ibid.: 379).11 Although not put explicitly in these terms, this
triple act of projection seems to be an act of the will, and so we can see this as an early
expression of Royce’s voluntarism. Royce’s tenth and final postulate of the “true critical
theory of Reality” makes the connection a little clearer:
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The goal of philosophy can only be reached in an Ethical Doctrine. For since the
ultimate fact of the knowing consciousness is the active construction of a world of
truth from the data of sense, the ultimate justification of this activity must be found
in the significance – i.e., in the moral worth – of this activity itself, a matter only to
be discussed in the light of Ethics. (Royce, 1881: 380)
9 If  this  is  still  not  clear  enough,  Royce’s  1903  American  Philosophical  Association
Presidential Address, published in 1904 in The Philosophical Review, asserts that under his
own understanding of his intellectual development this youthful correction to Kant is
thoroughly  pragmatist,  in  that  it  makes  even  the  most  basic  functions  of  cognition
actions bound by ethical norms:
It was a mere sketch. But since it expressed a sincere effort to state the theory of
truth  wholly  in  terms  of  an  interpretation  of  our  judgments  as  present
acknowledgements,  since  it  made  these  judgment  as  embodiments  of  conscious
attitudes that I then conceived to be essentially ethical, and to be capable of no
restatement in terms of any absolute warrant whatever, I  may assert that, for a
time at least, I did seriously struggle not only to be what is now a pragmatist, but
also to escape falling into the clutches of any Absolute. (Royce, 1904: 117)
10 In the intervening years Royce seemingly did fall into the clutches of an Absolute, while
also striving to maintain his early commitment to pragmatism/voluntarism. He published
numerous essays and several major works during this period, and here I will highlight
some  aspects  of  two:  The  Religious  Aspect  of  Philosophy (1885)  and  The  World  and  the
Individual (1899-1901). In particular, during this period we see some of Peirce’s criticisms
of Royce speak directly to the question of voluntarism.
 
3. Peirce and Royce: Increasing Appreciation for
Secondness
11 The Religious Aspect of Philosophy features, among other positions, one of Royce’s governing
insights: a transcendental proof of the Absolute from the possibility of error. First, that
there is error is an experiential fact. Error is the failure of an idea to represent its object.
But how is an error known to be an error? The mind must have an idea of the intended
object along with the misrepresented object. Kelly Parker (2008: 112) gives a concrete
example:  “If  I  think that my keys are on the hall  table,  but discover that my idea is
erroneous, I do not conclude that my keys never existed as the object of my thought.
Rather,  I  focus  on  an  idea  that  I  had  all  along  –  that  my  keys  do  definitely  exist
somewhere. They are the true object of an idea, and an object which is at the moment
available to me only imperfectly.”12 This is a higher order idea, that for Royce eventually
concatenates into an all-inclusive Absolute Thought (Royce, 1885: 426).
12 Royce  argues  that  this  Infinite  Thought  must  be  actual,  rejecting  the  view  of
‘Thrasymachus’ that “[…] if all were known to an all-knower, he would judge error to be
mistaken.” In his review of this volume Peirce recognizes himself as this “Royce-forsaken
Thrasymachus” and makes a remark especially relevant to our current inquiry: “[…] the
Hegelian  school  does  not  sufficiently  take  into  account  the  volitional  account  of
cognition”  (CP  8.41).  Peirce  continues  by  arguing  that  Royce  neglects  recent
developments  in  logic  (a  common  refrain  in  their  relationship),  especially  the
indispensable function of  an index in designating the subject  of  a  proposition.  More
generally, on Peirce’s view Royce neglects Secondness as Will: “The element of feeling is
so prominent in sensations, that we do not observe that something like Will enters into
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them, too” (CP 8.41).13 Will  is  the outward variety of  polar consciousness,  and “[t]he
capital error of Hegel which permeates his whole system in every part of it is that he
almost altogether ignores the Outward Clash” (CP 8.42).14 Thus,  we can see Peirce as
offering a voluntarististic corrective to Royce’s intellectualist Hegelianism.15
13 Peirce’s  review was unpublished,  and his  relationship with Royce would sour shortly
afterwards due to Peirce taking Francis Ellingwood Abbot’s side in his quarrel with Royce.
16 Indeed, Peirce’s criticism of Royce’s argument from error seems to have made little
impact,  for  as  Kelly  Parker  (2008:  116)  notes  “[Royce]  continues  to  present  it,  in  its
original form, until the end of his career.” Furthermore, Royce does not mention Peirce as
an  influence  in  1892’s  The  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy.  Their  relationship  improves,
however,  with  Royce  acknowledging  the  influence  of  Peirce’s  “brilliant  cosmological
essays” (the Monist Series  culminating in 1893’s  “Evolutionary Love”)  in 1895’s  “Self-
Consciousness,  Social  Consciousness,  and Nature  II”  (602).  Conversely,  in  1897 Peirce
approvingly notes that with Royce’s introduction of individual wills into his system in
1895’s The Conception of God “a seed of death […] [was] implanted in the Hegelian system.”
17 Again, we see Peirce suggesting that a larger interest in, or proper understanding of,
the Will improves Royce’s system.
14 Royce  was  greatly  impressed  by  Peirce’s  1898  Cambridge  Lectures,  and  again
acknowledges  Peirce’s  influence  in  his  The  World  and  the  Individual.  While  not  made
explicit, we can perhaps see some of Royce’s debt to Peirce in the following account of his
development from the preface of Volume I:
In  my  first  book  [The  Religious  Aspect  of  Philosophy]  the  conception  of  the
Absolute was defined in such wise as led me then to prefer, quite deliberately, the
use of the term Thought as the best name for the final unity of the Absolute. While
this  term  was  there  so  defined  as  to  make  Thought  inclusive  of  Will  and  of
Experience, these latter terms were not emphasize prominently enough, and the
aspects of the Absolute Life with they denote have since become more central in my
own interest. (Royce, 1900: ix)
15 Royce fulfills this promise to see the Absolute as more than Thought in at least two ways
in The World and the Individual. The first is his definition of ideas as essentially purposes:
“Whatever else our ideas are, and however much or little they may be, at any moment,
expressed in rich, sensuous imagery, it is certain that they are ideas not because they are
masses of series of images, but because they embody present conscious purposes. Every
idea is as much a volitional process as it is an intellectual process” (ibid.: 310-1). In other
words, the correspondence to its object that makes an idea true or false is not similarity,
as in a photograph looking like the person photographed, but rather in the fulfillment or
frustration of the embodied purpose. “When I have an idea of the world, my idea is a will,
and the  world of  my idea is  simply my own will  itself  determinately  embodied” (ibid.:  327).
Second, Royce combines this reconceptualization of ideas with his argument from error
to provide a non-Hegelian conception of the Absolute, one that Royce does not hesitate to
call God: “In him, namely, and as sharing in his perfect Will, my will comes consciously to
find wherein lies precisely what satisfies my will, and so makes my life, this unique life,
distinct from all other lives” (Royce, 1901: 435). In other words, now the final unity of the
Absolute is a unity of Willing, not only Knowing.
16 The influence of Peirce on Royce deepens after 1900, leading to a further reconstruction
of Royce’s Absolute as a Universal Community of Interpretation in 1913’s The Problem of
Christianity. However, these developments are commonly seen to come from engagement
with  Peirce’s  logic  conceived  as  semeiotic  rather  than  more  specific  voluntarist
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corrections to Royce’s Hegelian tendencies.18 Indeed, there Royce asserts that he now
owes more to Peirce than anything he might have owed to Hegel over the years (Royce,
1913:  I.xi-xii).19 Furthermore,  what  his  critics  see  as  a  Hegelian  logic  Royce  sees  as
Peircean,  and  thereby  both  independent  and  more  general  than  Hegel’s  logic  (ibid.:
II.184-5). In this way Royce’s critics (and here James is probably at the foremost of Royce’s
mind) have some justification for their confusion of Hegel and Peirce. H. G. Townsend
argues that Peirce and Hegel are closer than even Royce admits. So why does Royce side
with Peirce? Because of “[…] one respect in which the difference between Peirce and
Hegel  is  fundamental  and  significant.  Peirce’s  mind leans  hard  toward  voluntarism”
(Townsend, 1928: 301). Townsend sees this both in the Peircean account of interpretation
Royce  gives  in  The  Problem  of  Christianity as  well  as  the  role  of  agency  in  his  logic,
especially System Σ.20 Thus, while Peirce is not the sole voluntarist influence on Royce, he
might have been the decisive one: “I have no doubt that this is the secret of [Royce’s]
confessed indebtedness to Peirce. Peirce taught him how to find a place for the will in a
universe of Hegelian absolutes” (Townsend, 1928: 302). 
17 I do not mean to suggest that Peirce is a radical voluntarist, for Secondness is only one of
three irreducible categories present to varying degrees in all phenomena, so the “Will” is
not simply Secondness. Furthermore, I take seriously his reminder about the formulation
of pragmatic maxim in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”: “This employment five times over
of derivatives of concipere must then have had a purpose […] One was to show that I was
speaking of  meaning in  no sense  that  that  of  intellectual  purport”  (CP 5.402 Fn P3).21
Nonetheless, balancing intellectualism and voluntarism is perhaps part of why Peirce and
Royce came to see each other as philosophically kindred spirits. Of course, Peirce was not
the only pragmatist offering voluntarist insights to Royce, so let us now turn to James.
 
4. James and Royce: Engaging with Experimental
Psychology
18 Again, in 1904 Royce saw his 1881 Kant paper as an expression of a ‘pure pragmatism’: “I
was  then twenty-six  years  old  and had been deeply  influenced by  Professor  James’s
earlier lectures and essays” (Royce, 1904: 117). Given this early date, James’ original 1879
version of “Sentiment of Rationality” is likely the key text.22 Of course, by 1904 James’
“Will to Believe” further influenced Royce. However, even more so than between Royce
and Peirce, detailing all of the interactions between James and Royce is a monumental
task.  Fortunately,  this  task  has  been  undertaken  by  scholars  such  as  Clendenning,
Oppenheim,  Kegley,  and Auxier,  so  I  need  not  repeat  all  of  it  here.23 In  short,  the
continual debate between James and Royce led James to intensify his commitment to
empiricism and pluralism, if anything, while Royce maintained his own commitment to
some form of Absolutism. While we will see some more of Royce’s critique of James below,
here I want to focus on suggestion by Auxier (2013: 102): “This is a feature of Royce’s
thought that is often overlooked – that is voluntarism, while often stated as a fundamental
postulate  when he  does  metaphysics,  is  based upon an empirical  psychology.”  Thus,
rather than rehearsing a fairly well known story about James and Royce’s inability to
convert  each  other,  let  us  look  a  little  more  closely  at  their  shared  background  in
psychology.
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19 In addition to the influence of the early James, by 1881 Royce had studied psychology
with Wilhelm Wundt.24 Widely regarded as the father of psychology, Wundt was deeply
influenced by Leibniz, and he produced a variety of philosophical works, such as his 1886
Ethik.25 Significantly  for  our  present  inquiry,  Wundt  argued  for  what  is  now  called
psychological  voluntarism.  For  Wundt,  consciousness  originates  in  sensation.  However,
sensations  are  always  already  presented  as  representations  that,  if  considered  as
representing external reality, are perceptions. Conscious awareness might also be more
or  less  broad,  and  Wundt  calls  perceptions  in  the  “focal  point”  of  consciousness
apperceptions.  Obviously, this is a precursor to James’ “focus” and “fringe.”26 However,
perceptions do not transform into apperceptions passively, but rather through an act of
attending or will: “[…] the act of apperception in every case consists in an inner act of
will” (Wundt, 1880: I.34). This act of will provides the unity of apperception, in contrast to
seemingly intellectual act of synthesis via the categories in Kant’s account.27 In addition,
as apperceptions are also representations, ideas, at least insofar as we are aware of them,
are products of the will.
20 In  the  The  World  and  the  Individual  Royce  (1901:  I.23)  says:  “[…]  an  idea  appears  in
consciousness  as  having the significance of  an act  of  will.”  Indeed,  Royce holds  this
position as early as 1882’s “How Beliefs are Made”: “When impressions are modified by
attention […] [which], in its most elementary forms, is the same activity that, in a more
developed shape, we commonly call will. We attend to one thing rather than another,
because we will to do so, and our will is here the elementary impulse to know” (Royce,
1920: 345).28 Thus, while Royce was influenced by James (who was 13 years Royce’s senior)
from early  on,  this  was  in  part  because  of  their  shared background in  voluntaristic
experimental psychology, especially concerning the role of attention in cognition. For
example, from James’ “Attention” chapter in The Principles of Psychology: “The practical
and theoretical life of whole species, as well as of individual beings, results from the
selection which the habitual direction of their attention involves […] Suffice it meanwhile
that each of us literally chooses, by his way of attending to things, what sort of a universe
he  shall  appear  to  himself  to  inhabit”  (James,  1890:  I.424).  Replace  ‘chooses’  with
‘projects’  and  we  have  something  much like  the  position  Royce  held  since  his  Kant
address.  Nonetheless,  Royce and James are typically seen as philosophical  opponents,
despite this shared background. Why so? One reason is James’ combination of voluntarist
psychology  with  “the  principle  of  Peirce”  to  develop  his  own  form  of  pragmatism,
conceived as both a method for clarifying ideas and as a theory of truth. Royce rebuts
with an Absolute Voluntarism and an Absolute Pragmatism. However, another reason is
that Royce, like Peirce, sees James’ pragmatism as too individualistic; not simply in the
sense of particular differences made to particular individuals, but in failing to emphasize
that  individual  wills  are  themselves  fundamentally  social.29 In  his  own  Outlines  of
Psychology, Royce substitutes the common distinctions of Feeling, Intellect, and Will with
Sensitiveness,  Docility,  and Initiative,  with the ‘will’  playing a  role  throughout.30 For
example, he concludes the section on Sensitiveness (which includes sensations, images,
and feelings) with “[…] the whole consciousness of any moment is an expression of the
will of that moment, in so far as that will is concerned with these sensory experiences,
and with these objects, in view of the present values which our feelings give to the objects
in question” (Royce, 1903: 196). This is a primordial form of will, or conation more broadly,
while the fuller concept of Will can only come after an account of docility, or our ability
to  learn;  in  particular,  through  imitation.31 Through  imitation  of  others  we  come  to
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develop our individuality and to grow a will of our own through the organization of our
desires.32 The need to satisfy more than our individual will does not go away however,
even for ‘pure’ pragmatists: “It is the need that I before called the need of companionship,
the need not only of thinking for ourselves, but of finding somebody who either will agree
with us, or else at least, to our mode of thinking, ought to agree with us” (Royce, 1903:
126).33 Even the pluralist, Royce notes, wants people to agree with him. This felt need for
companionship pushes even a pure pragmatist to be more than a pragmatist, and in a
variation of  Royce’s  argument  form error  culminates  in  the Absolute  –  “[a]ll  that  is
practical borrows its truth from the Eternal” (Royce, 1903: 142). Here is Royce’s Absolute
Pragmatism, though not yet by that name. What of his Absolute Voluntarism? As with
“pragmatism,” Royce adopts (or attempts to co-opt) a newly popular designation for his
position.
 
5. Tufts and Schiller: Naming a Tradition
21 While  we  have  been  talking  about  the  voluntarism  of  the  pragmatists,  the  term
“voluntarism” itself arrives comparatively late. For example, the only mention in Peirce’s
Collected Papers is an, at best, half-hearted agreement with one of Schiller’s definitions of
pragmatism: “[…] a conscious application to epistemology (or logic) of a teleological psychology,
which implies, ultimately, a voluntaristic metaphysic” (Schiller, 1912: 12).34 Likewise, Royce
does not use the term until his 1908 Heidelberg Address “The Problem of Truth in the
Light of Recent Discussion,” republished in 1911’s William James and Other Essays on the
Philosophy of Life.
22 The advent of “voluntarism” as a common term of art appears to be 1901’s Baldwin’s
Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. The topic has an entry of two full double-column
pages written by James Hayden Tufts, who at this point had been developing the Chicago
School of Pragmatism with Dewey, George Herbert Mead, and others, for almost a decade.
Here is Tufts’ definition:
Voluntarism (in metaphysics) […] The theory that the ultimate nature of reality is
to  be  conceived  as  some  form  of  will  (or  conation);  contrasted  with
INTELLECTUALISM (q.v.). (Tufts, 1901: 807; etymology omitted)
23 Tufts goes on to trace these contrasting tendencies in the history of Western philosophy,
with the Greeks as intellectualists and Augustine as a voluntarist; in the medieval period
Ibn Rushd, Aquinas, and Eckhart were intellectualists, while Ibn Gabirol, Duns Scotus, and
William  of  Occam  defended  voluntarism.  The  early  modern  period  is  largely
intellectualist,  with  Spinoza  as  the  best  representative  and  Leibniz  as  attempting  a
voluntarist  correction.35 In  contrast,  the  late  modern period shows voluntarism as  a
growing tendency, rooted in Kant. As for the nineteenth century: “Following Kant, two
distinct types of voluntarism have proceeded […] They may be called respectively rational
and  irrational  voluntarism,  whose  originators  were  respectively  Fichte  and
Schopenhauer” (Tufts, 1901: 808). Rational voluntarists include Wilhelm Wundt, Maine de
Biran (1766-1824), Charles Renouvier (1815-1903), and William James, while Tufts sees
Eduard  von  Hartmann  (1842-1906)  and  Friedrich  Nietzsche  as  developers  of
Schopenhauerian irrational voluntarism. Royce does not merit a mention.36 
24 Let  me  say  a  few  things  concerning the  three  less  famous  names  given  by  Tufts:
Renouvier,  von  Hartmann,  and  de  Biran.  First,  Renouvier  is  mostly  remembered  for
inspiring James to believe in free will.  However, Jeremy Dunham (2015: 2) argues the
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influence is deeper: “[…] what is vital for James about Renouvier’s theory of free will is
not the affirmation of its existence, but rather they way Renouvier connects it to his
theory  of  knowledge  and  psychology  of  belief.”  Significantly,  Renouvier  was  a  self-
identified idealist, though not a Hegelian, and thereby provided James with resources to
reject Absolute Idealism but not idealism tout court. In particular, Renouvier’s idealism
offers “[…] a radical voluntarist alternative […]” (ibid.: 6).37 Second, von Hartmann was
well known to Peirce, James, and Royce. For example, Peirce writes: “But I do not believe
that psychology can be set to rights until the importance of Hartmann’s argument [that
there  is  unconscious  mind]  is  acknowledged”  (CP  7.364).  More  specifically,  for  von
Hartmann not only is there unconscious mind, “[…] the will in and of itself is under all
circumstances unconscious” (1884: II.102). Finally, Biran is at the beginning of a tradition
of  French  Voluntarism,  reaching  into  the  thought  of  Henri  Bergson,  another  key
influence on James. However, L. Susan Stebbing (1914: 11) argues that while the tradition
of French Voluntarism “[…] exhibits in Renouvier an element, which, mingling with the
‘principle  of  Peirce,’  brings  forth  the  pragmatism  of  William  James,  it  nevertheless
developes [sic] on independent and even antagonistic lines.”38 So here we have another
tradition distinct from German Idealism that informs American Pragmatism.
25 Stebbing (1914: 13) offers a useful expansion of Tufts’ definition of “Voluntarism”:
Its essential distinction from “Intellectualism” or “Rationalism” may be summed up
briefly in that Voluntarism holds that psychologically,  will  is  more fundamental
than intellect; that metaphysically, the ultimate nature of reality is some form of
will;  finally,  that  in  epistemology,  will  must  be  recognised  as  essential  to  the
construction of truth […]39
26 We  have  already  seen  more  or  less  qualified  forms  of  each  of  these  voluntarisms.
Returning  to  the  provenance  of  “voluntarism,”  Schiller  uses  the  term  in  his  1903
Humanism,  which Dewey reviewed in 1904 for The Psychological  Bulletin.40 There Dewey
makes an equivocation, not unjustly, that helps drive the subsequent uptake of the term:
“Voluntarism, now termed Pragmatism, which I should prefer to call Instrumentalism, is
characteristic of the book throughout” (Dewey, 1904: 335).41 We will return to Dewey’s
conception of voluntarism, especially in his understanding of Royce’s philosophy, shortly.
For now, let us dwell a little more with some forgotten observers of the debates about
pragmatism.
27 For example, in 1905 Alfred Hoernlé argued for the thesis of this present paper:
What seems to me to give the conflict between Pragmatism and Absolutism its real
importance and significance is that it is but a phase in that wider conflict between
Intellectualism  and  Voluntarism,  the  roots  of  which  can  be  traced  back to  the
reaction  against  the  Hegelian  Philosophy  in  Germany  in  the  years  1840-80.
(Hoernlé, 1905: 21)
28 In  this  article  Hoernlé  takes  James  Ward’s  Gifford  Lectures,  published  in  1899  as
Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  as  illustrative  of  Voluntarism.42 Since  Hoernlé  sees
contemporary Voluntarism as primarily epistemological, he then proceeds to a critical
exposition of Bradley’s Absolutist/Intellectualist account of knowledge, truth, and the
relationship between logic and psychology. This is preparation for a second article on
Pragmatism as presented by James and Schiller, which we will focus on here.43 Hoernlé
admits his account of pragmatism is debatable because of the absence of a systematic
exposition  on behalf  of  its  proponents,  but  again  he  sees  it  as  primarily  a  doctrine
concerning  the  nature  of  truth  and  knowledge,  one  that  recognizes  the  seemingly
insuperable gap between the Absolute and Appearance.  “This takes us to the central
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doctrine of Pragmatism, which I take to be the insistence on the purposiveness of our
whole mental life” (Hoernlé, 1905b: 446). For the Pragmatist, thought is a kind of action,
and therefore true beliefs are marked in a similar fashion to successful actions – they are
‘satisfactory’ or ‘work.’ Pragmatism is not a pure subjectivism, despite the claims of its
critics, because ideas are ‘made true’ by a process of experience, not simply by us. “This
double-faced nature of truth, as partly revealing itself to us, partly made by us, seems
best explained by the willing, purposive element of our nature. It is primarily so far as the
world opposes itself to us and check our activities, whether theoretical or practical, that
we  distinguish  ourselves  from  it”  (ibid.:  452).44 Hoernlé  sees  predecessors  of  this
voluntarism in Descartes and Spinoza – all acts of judgment are acts of will – and also the
possibility of bridging the gap between faith and knowledge left by Kant (ibid.: 453; 455).
Most significantly for our purposes:
I am bold enough to think that the doctrine of the development of a consciousness
of self and a consciousnesses of the world, i.e., of a subject and object, in relation
and opposition to each other – a doctrine with which Hegelian writers have made
us abundantly familiar – could be reconciled with that I hold to be the fundamental
point of Pragmatism by the recognition of that self-consciousness as essentially a
purposive and willing consciousness. (Ibid.: 455)
29 This  paper  remains  agnostic  as  to  whether  Hegel’s  account  of  self-consciousness  is
essentially,  or  sufficiently,  purposive.  Clearly,  rehabilitating  teleological  notions,
including the purposiveness of nature, is a major part of Hegel’s project.45 What Hoernlé
and other commentators show us is  that pragmatism was commonly seen as at least
bringing something to idealism, if not opposing it entirely, in arguing for voluntarism over
intellectualism. Another example: “Mr. Schiller’s jaunty onslaughts on Kantian apriorism,
Bradleian  absolutism and  all  other  forms  of  intellectualism  are  interesting  reading”
(Leighton, 1904: 149).46 Thus, when Royce declares in “The Problem of Truth in Light of
Recent Discussion” that “[…] the solving word of the theory of truth is Voluntarism” he is
self-consciously identifying with a position seen as distinctive of, perhaps even identical
with, pragmatism (Royce, 1911: 198). Or, as Royce refers to it repeatedly in this address,
instrumentalism.  That  is,  Royce  sees  the  instrumentalism  of  Dewey,  as  well  as  the
pragmatism of James, as inspired by a voluntarism he shares with both. And yet, this
voluntarism is insufficient if understood as individualistic or relativistic: 
For what we hereby learn is that all truth is indeed relative to the expression of our
will, but that the will inevitably determines for itself forms of activity which are
objectively valid and absolute, just because to attempt to inhibit these forms is once
more to act, and is to act in accordance with them. (Royce, 1911: 250)47
30 In other words, Royce sees Dewey’s instrumentalism, James’ pragmatism, and Schiller’s
humanism as voluntarism by another name, at least after voluntarism becomes a popular
name for a long-standing tendency. In addition, as voluntarisms, each putatively is driven
by their own logic towards Royce’s non-Hegelian Absolute.  Finally,  by identifying his
Absolute Voluntarism with Absolute Pragmatism, Royce in effect declares himself (and
Peirce) as the only real pragmatists. So what did Dewey say about (absolute) voluntarism?
 
6. Dewey and Royce: Critiquing the Possibility of
Absolute Voluntarism
31 In many ways, Dewey’s intellectual background is similar to Royce’s, as he studied Kant
with Henry Augustus Pearson Torrey (1837-1902) in Vermont, and with the philosopher
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George  Sylvester  Morris  (1840-1889)  and  the  psychologist  Granville  Stanley  Hall
(1846-1924) at Johns Hopkins in the early 1880’s.48 Nonetheless, as might be expected,
Dewey had as little use for “voluntarism” as he did for any -ism. In his preface to 1910’s
The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays, Dewey (1910: ix) notes 
[…] a  recent  German  critic  has  described  pragmatism  as  “Epistemologically,
nominalism;  psychologically,  voluntarism;  cosmologically,  energism;
metaphysically, agnosticism’ ethically, meliorism on the basis of the Bentham-Mill
utilitarianism.” It maybe that pragmatism will turn out to be all of this formidable
array;  but  even should  it,  the  one  who thus  defines  it  has  hardly  come within
earshot of it.49
32 This is because pragmatism, as a spirit of continual reconstruction, resists classification
in terms of  the prior  systems it  is  reconstructing.  This  is  not  to deny pragmatism’s
relation  to  the history  of  philosophy,  but runs  the  risk  of  unpragmatically  seeing
pragmatism as a set of fixed doctrines established in no longer extant conditions of life. 
33 On the other hand, when it came to the symposium held in Royce’s honor at the 1915
American Philosophical Association, published in the following year in The Philosophical
Review, Dewey is happy to use Royce’s terminology.50 Dewey situates the development of
Royce’s  philosophy along the axis  of  voluntarism and intellectualism,  the latter here
understood as  “[…]  any philosophy which treats  the  subject-matter  of  experience as
primarily and fundamentally an object of cognition” (Dewey, 1916: 245 Fn1). Dewey also
begins with Royce’s 1881 Kant address,  and argues that is is indeed an expression of
voluntarism. However, Dewey contends that Royce demotes voluntarism in 1885’s the
Religious  Aspect  of  Philosophy,  making  intellectualism  primary  in  his  account  of  the
Absolute as  an Absolute Thought.51 This  is  so even though Dewey acknowledges that
Royce’s  treatment  of  all  cognitive  ideas  is  voluntaristic.  Dewey also  admits  that  the
account of the Absolute in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy is somewhat anomalous: “[…]
in  the  formulations  of  this  absolute  knowing  consciousness  intellectualistic
considerations  predominate  to  a  greater  extent  than  in  Mr.  Royce’s  subsequent
formulations” (Dewey, 1916: 252).52
34 Dewey’s remarks are fair enough, as we have already highlighted some ways Royce strove
to  reconcile  his  voluntarist  commitments  with  his  intellectualist  impulses.53 Dewey
continues with two potential lines of criticism of Royce. The first is that solutions are
relative to problems, and “[w]ith Mr. Royce the problem is fixed by the results of the
Kantian philosophy, taken in its broad sense” (Dewey, 1916: 252). Thus, while Dewey does
not make the implication explicit, those unmotivated by Kantian problems will tend to be
unsatisfied with Royce’s solution. Second, and most significantly for us, Dewey denies
that Royce is a pragmatist, on three grounds. One, while pragmatism might be stated in
psychological terms, and thereby be a kind of psychological voluntarism, it does not have
to be stated so. Two, on Dewey’s view there is no attention to empirical consequences in
Royce (at least, in 1881), arguing that Peirce himself repudiated this as a Practicalism, but
not  Pragmatism.54 Three,  Royce’s  theory  of  judgment  is  both  intellectualist  and
voluntarist, but still not pragmatist: “Construing the operation of fulfilling a supreme
cognitive interest in terms of purpose and will is a very different thing from construing
cognitive  interest  in  terms  of  a  process  of  fulfilment  of  other  interests,  vital,  social,
ethical, esthetic, technological, etc.” (Dewey, 1916: 253).55 Indeed, the voluntarism of 1881
transforms into the intellectualism of 1885 because of Royce’s latent ethical absolutism.
In other words, even with Royce’s voluntarism, he was never a real pragmatist.56
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35 Royce scholars, such as Auxier and Oppenheim, have argued that Dewey’s focus on the
1880’s, despite some references to Royce’s later work, is unfair to Royce. Dewey is kinder
in a 1930 address,  in part  because of  minimizing the ill spoken of  the dead,  in part
because of an apparent greater familiarity with the later Royce. There Dewey concedes
something  pragmatic  in  Royce:  “It  is  well  known  that  Royce  was  favorable  to  a
voluntaristic pragmatic theory of ideas, in their empirical aspect as distinct from their
ultimate metaphysical status” (Oppenheim, 2001: 211). Nonetheless, Dewey repeats his
1916 criticism that Royce solutions are unacceptable because they derive from problems
wrongly  stated.  Likewise,  “I  have  had  to  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  idealistic
tradition  from  which  Royce  started  continued  to  hamper  him  and  prevented  a  full
development of [his] own intrinsic genius” (Oppenheim, 2001: 214). Again, while Dewey
does  not  make it  explicit,  we can interpret  intellectualistic  idealism as  the tradition
hampering Royce’s intrinsic voluntaristic pragmatism.
 
7. Conclusion
36 I intended the title of this paper as a genuine question, though one I hope to have put
additional force behind. As Dewey argues, solutions are relative to problems, and perhaps
the problem of the relation between German Idealism and American Pragmatism is better
recast  as  the  contest  between  intellectualism  and  voluntarism.  Of  course,  offering
another opposed set of traditions may only amplify the complexity of the relationship
between the traditions of idealism and pragmatism, but sometimes a thread that leads us
through a labyrinth does so by showing us how convoluted the labyrinth is.  Royce’s
Absolute Voluntarism is a fertile line of inquiry because it helps us to see how his efforts
to reconcile intellectualism and voluntarism informed, and were informed by, his fellow
pragmatists. With Peirce, we saw both the well-known admonition that Royce study logic
as  well  as  a  less-known call  for  a  greater  appreciation for  Secondness  and a  proper
conception  of  the  Will.  James  was  a  constant  influence  on  Royce’s  thought,  in  part
because of their mutual background in the voluntaristic psychology of Wundt.  As for
Dewey, he showed that Royce’s psychological, even metaphysical, voluntarism may not
have been enough to make him a full pragmatist. 
37 Nonetheless, voluntarism is likely the right question to ask. With voluntarism we were
able to open windows upon other lines of influence that, while often refracted through
the prism of Kant, are also distinct from at least Hegel’s form of German idealism. Again,
Wundt’s voluntaristic psychology reaches back to the idealism of Leibniz, Fichte takes a
larger  role,  and  the  consonances  with  Schopenhauer  and  Nietzsche  are  more  clear.
Likewise, Bergson’s Intuitionism continues a tradition of French Voluntarism with pre-
Kantian  roots,  and  includes  Renouvier,  an  undeniable  influence  on  James.57 Finally,
thanks to Baldwin and Schiller promoting the term as defined by Tufts, “voluntarism”
became more  or  less  a  keyword for  the  classical  pragmatists,  and more  broadly  for
commentators and participants in the debates surrounding pragmatism. Of course, the
distance of over one hundred years might grant us a clarity they lacked; nonetheless, we
should strive to include the forgotten in our community of inquiry.
Voluntarism
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NOTES
1. For  example,  John  Herman  Randall Jr.,  identifies  at  least  four  schools  of  American
philosophical  idealism.  Regarding  our  present  topic,  Randall  (1966)  emphasizes  Royce’s
consistent  refusal  to  identify  as  a  Hegelian  (63),  and  was  instead  more  influenced  by  the
voluntarism of Schopenhauer (69) and of Fichte (72).
2. See LW 5: 154; cf. Good 2006, and Shook 2000.
3. “Modern  Voluntarism  is  chiefly  due,  if  I  mistake  not,  to  the  effort  escape  the  relentless
conclusions  of  science,  which  are  hostile  to  many current,  especially  religious,  conceptions”
(Spiller 1904: 428).
4. To add three more: the influence of Ralph Waldo Emerson and other transcendentalists, the
U.S. Civil War, and the subsequent Third Great Awakening. Regarding the first: “The generation
before  the  transcendentalists  was  emotionally  starved;  that  before  the  pragmatists  was
intellectually over-fed. Given in one case Calvinism, and in the other Hegelianism, and a common
result was brought about. The rigid determinism of the one, and the monotonous dialectic of the
other issued in a common revolty of the will and of the feelings” (Riley 1909: 264).
5. Royce  also  acknowledges  the  Kant  scholar  Hans  Vaihinger’s  Die  Philosophy  des  Als  Ob (The
Philosophy  of  “As  If”)  as  an expression of  Voluntarism independent  of  pragmatism.  Vaihinger
claims that his Principle of Fictionalism (that false theoretical ideas might still  be practically
useful) is not pragmatism (Vaihinger, 2014: viii),  though he does assert that Kant is a kind of
Critical  Pragmatist  (ibid.:  305).  Vaihinger  attributes  his  own voluntarism  to  Schopenhauer:
“Schopenhauer’s  teaching  gave  me  much  that  was  new  and  great  and  lasting,  pessimism,
irrationalism, and voluntarism. The impression he made upon me was, although not extensively,
yet  certainly  intensively  greater  than  that  of  Kant”  (ibid.: xxviii-xxix).  As  we  will  see  later,
Schopenhauer was a significant influence on Royce’s voluntarism as well.
6. I say “semi-independent” because the influence of Kant, and thereby some form of idealism,
looms over basically all of nineteenth century Western philosophy.
7. “Concreteness requires an appeal to history, to our actual,  historical situatedness and (for
understanding of this situatedness) an exploration of a complex, tangled past” (Colapietro, 1992:
424).
8. In “On Purpose in Thought” from a year prior Royce presents a similar account of ‘projection,’
which he sees as “[…] substantially the same as in the thesis presented to the Johns Hopkins
Faculty as a candidate for the Doctor’s Degree in spring of 1878 […]” (Royce, 1920: 260).
9. CP 8.7-38 and CP 5.388-410, respectively.  From the former: “A better rule for avoiding the
deceits  of  language  is  hit:  Do  things  fulfill  the  same function  practically?  Then let  them be
signified by the same word. Do they not? Then let them be distinguished” (CP 8.33). From the
latter: “It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is
as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive
the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our
conception of the object” (CP 5.402).
10. This is not to say that Royce does not take Schopenhauer seriously; see Auxier 2013, and
Carlson  2016  for  more  on  Royce’s  engagement  with  Schopenhauer.  Another  candidate  for
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Alogical Monism that Royce took seriously is Nietzsche: “It is rarely appreciated in Royce studies
the extent to which he followed and was influenced by the work of Nietzsche” (Auxier, 2013: 29).
See also Privitello 2016.
11. Of course, Peirce suggests a similar relation to Kant in 1905: “The Kantist has only abjure
from the  bottom of  his  heart  the  proposition  the  thing-in-itself  can,  however  indirectly,  be
conceived; and then correct the details of Kant’s doctrine accordingly, and he will find himself to
have become a Critical Common-sensist” (CP 5.452).  This does not mean his correction is the
same  as  Royce’s,  however;  for  example,  almost  all  of  Peirce’s  uses  of  “projection”  are
geometrical.  Instead,  Peirce  advocates  for  a  Doctrine  of  Immediate  Perception,  even  of  an
immediate  perception of  the indefinitely  past  because time is  a  continuum. “But  once grant
immediate knowledge in time, and what becomes of the idealist  theory that we immediately
know only the present?” (CP 1.38). In this light, Royce is still very much an idealist in 1881.
12. Cp.  Scott  (1991:  25):  “The  very  intuition  of  one’s  own  ignorance  and  fallibility  is  then,
according to Royce, a sign of the possibility of an expanded consciousness in which there is no
gap between idea and fact, in which our conceptions find themselves actualized in experience.”
13. Peirce continues: “You may quarrel with the word volition if you like; I wish I had a more
general one at my hand.” In general, while Peirce continually emphasizes the “volitional” aspect
of experience, he also worries about importing psychological concepts by using “Will” to describe
this aspect; for example, “[…] what I call Molition, which is volition minus all desire and purpose,
the mere consciousness of exertion of any kind […] Molition is a double consciousness of exertion
and resistance” (CP 8.303-304). Peirce almost certainly coined “molition” from the Latin molere,
“to grind.” See also CP 8.178 and 8.315.
14. See CP 1.389 (from “A Guess at the Riddle” 1887-1888) for the terminology of “immediate”
(Firstness),  “polar”  (Secondness),  and  “synthetic”  (Thirdness)  consciousness  or  sense;  cp.
primisense, altersense, and medisense (CP 7.551). 
15. Though I should note that Royce (1885: xi) declares in the preface to The Religious Aspect of
Philosophy: “The author, however, cannot call himself an Hegelian, much as he owes to Hegel.”
Just before this Royce (ibid.: x) distinguishes “[…] two Hegels: one an uncompromising idealist,
with his general and fruitful insistence upon the great fundamental truths of idealism; the other
the technical  Hegel of  the ‘Logik,’  whose dialectical  method seems destined to remain,  not a
philosophy, but the idea of a philosophy.” Royce rejects the latter Hegel, and with the former
recognizes a debt that properly belongs to the idealistic movement as a whole.
16. For a brief account of the “Abbot Affair,” and Peirce’s relationship with Royce overall, see
Oppenheim 1997. The definitive biography of Royce remains Clendenning 1999.
17. Quoted in Oppenheim (1997: 259), from 30 December 1897 review in The Nation. Perovich 2016
argues that this voluntarist shift comes at least in part from Royce’s return to Fichte during this
period.
18. This is not to say the influence was one-sided; again, see Oppenheim 1997.
19. Also, “It is time, I think, that the long customary, but unjust and loose usage of the adjective
‘Hegelian’ should be dropped” (ibid.: xi).
20. See  Pratt  (2010:  204):  “Like  other  idealists  of  the  time,  Royce  viewed  consciousness  (in
particular,  conscious  choice  or  voluntarism)  as  an  essential  component  of  any  account  of
knowledge (and any account of social systems, ethics, and science as well).” Cp. Thompson (1956:
433-4) on Cotton: “Voluntarism is the central theme of Royce’s logic as well as his metaphysics.”
21. On the other hand: “Such reasonings and all reasonings turn upon the idea that if one exerts
certain kinds of volition, one will undergo in return certain compulsory perceptions […] Hence is
justified the maxim, belief in which constitutes pragmatism […]” (CP 5.9). Also see CP 5.488 Fn P1:
“[…] voluntary inhibition, which is the chief characteristic of mankind,” and cp. Colapietro 1985.
22. Cf. Jarvis (1975: 151 fn 42). 
23. See especially Oppenheim 2005, and Auxier 2013.
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24. While  in  Germany  Royce  studied  philosophy  with  the  neo-Kantian  Wilhelm  Windelband
(1848-1915)  and Rudolph Hermann Lotze  (1817-1881),  an  especially  influential  and neglected
critic of Hegelian Idealism.
25. As Mary Whiton Calkins’ (1901: 435) notes in her own psychology text, “Perhaps the most
significant contribution of psychology is his sharp distinction between inattentive and attentive
consciousness  (petites  perceptions  and  apperception).”  Calkins  studied  with  James,  Royce,
Santayana, as well as Hugo Münsterberg, another student of Wundt’s.
26. Though James had qualms with Wundt’s terminology, at least: “I must confess finding all
Wundt’s utterances about ‘apperception’ both vacillating and obscure. I see no use whatever for
the word,  as he employs it,  in Psychology.  Attention,  perception,  conception,  volition are its
ample equivalents” (James, 1890: I.89).
27. I say “seemingly” because the transcendental unity of consciousness/apperception is one of
the more obscure parts of  Kant.  The term “apperception” comes into psychology via Johann
Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), who drew on Leibniz as well as Kant.
28. Philp argues that Royce’s account of attention “[…] developed into the Voluntarism for which
Royce stands in the academic world” (Philp, 1916: 22).
29. See (Auxier 2013: 142). 
30. In addition to the novelty of this set of distinctions Royce (1903: viii)  highlights “[…] the
persistent  stress  I  lay  upon the  unity  of  the  intellectual  and  voluntary  processes,  which,  in
popular treatises, are too often sundered, and treated as if one of them could go on without the
other  […].”  Again,  think of  Peirce’s  recasting of  Feeling,  Willing,  and Knowing as  immediate
feeling, polar sense, and synthetical consciousness (CP 1.382 “A Guess at the Riddle”). With both
set of terms Peirce’s innovation is in distinguishing Feeling and Sensation, placing the later as a
mode of polar sense along with the Will.
31. “In brief, the preservation of a happy balance between the imitative functions and those that
emphasise  social  contrasts  and  oppositions  forms  the  basis  for  every  higher  type  of  mental
activity”  (Royce  1903:  279).  Furthermore,  “[…]  all  the  functions  which  constitute  self-
consciousness show themselves outwardly in social reactions, that is, in dealing with other real
or ideal personages, and are, in our own minds, profoundly related to and inseparable from our
social consciousness) (ibid.: 279-80; original emphasis removed). Royce argues for this as early as
1894’s “The External World and Social Consciousness.”
32. “But what is my will? By nature I know not; for by birth I am a mere eddy in the turbulent
stream if inherited human passion. How, then shall I get a will of my own? Only through social
training” (Royce 1908: 35).
33. Compare the role of the ‘social impulse’ in Peirce’s 1877 “The Fixation of Belief” (CP 5.378,
5.384); the phrase also appears in 1878’s “The Doctrine of Chances” (CP 2.655).
34. Quoted in CP 5.494. No variant of “Voluntarism” is noted in the Robin Catalog. I say “half-
hearted, at best” because Peirce says if we redefine “psychology” to mean “common sense” he
might agree with Schiller.
35. George Santayana considered Leibniz the first German philosopher, whose voluntarism is a
symptom of the egotism of German philosophy: “From this metaphor [of an ‘unconscious’ Will],
when its boldness seems to be dulled by use, we may pass insensibly to giving the name of Will to
that whole transcendental potency of the soul which, like the mainspring of a watch, lay coiled
up tightly within it  from the beginning of time” (Santayana,  1915:  36-7).  For Santayana,  this
tradition of German egotism ultimately expresses itself in the political developments culminating
in  World War I:  “Not  that  the  German philosophers  are  responsible  for  the  war,  or  for  that
recrudescence of  corporate fanaticism which prepared it  from afar.  They merely shared and
justified  prophetically  that  spirit  of  uncompromising self-assertion and metaphysical  conceit
which the German nation is now reducing to action” (ibid.: 7). See also Strehle 2011.
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36. Of course, mentioning the long history of voluntarism is not to deny the originality of the
pragmatists: “No one who remembers his history of philosophy would think of calling this in
either  its  content  or  its  method  a  ‘brand  new’  discovery  […]  On  the  other  hand,  this  same
historical sense should make it equally impossible, even from a very superficial survey, to regard
the movement as a mere masquerade of some earlier type of voluntarism” (Moore, 1904: 748).
37. Dunham goes on to show that Renouvier’s idealist methodology informs James’ pragmatism
as a whole, especially his “Will to Believe.”
38. More strongly: “It is the fashion among present day philosophers to depreciate reason, and in
the forefront of these are the French Voluntarists – especially the Bergsonian Intuitionists – and
the  Pragmatists.  But  in  their  methods  and  conclusions  they  are  obviously  opposed  and  an
attempt is made to show that in no sense can the French Voluntarists be classed as Pragmatists”
(Stebbing, 1914: v). Furthermore, Stebbing contends that both American Pragmatism and French
Voluntarism have insufficient conceptions of truth compared to Intellectualism.
39. Of course, this does not exhaust the varieties of “voluntarism.” For example, Cantrell argues
that James, following Royce’s The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, is a theological voluntarist in “The
Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life”: “[…] consistent with current discussion in metaethics, I
mean simply that James held an obligation to perform some action has whatever moral status is
possesses in virtue of God’s commanding (or failing to command) the relevant action” (Cantrell,
2013: 5).
40. In  “The  Ethical  Basis  of  Metaphysics,”  an  Ethical  Society  address  also  published  in  the
International Journal of Ethics. Here is the usage: “[…] [Pragmatism] is a conscious application to
the  theory  of  life  of  the  psychological  facts  of  cognition  as  they  appear  to  a  teleological
Voluntarism” (Schiller, 1912: 8). I should note that here Schiller criticizes Baldwin’s, James’, and
Peirce’s definitions of “pragmatism” in Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology – Peirce’s
is  “[…]  so  obvious  to  be  comparatively  unimportant  […]”  while  James’  is  insufficiently
psychologically voluntarist, and Baldwin’s insufficiently metaphysically voluntarist.
41. In  addition  to  Dewey,  A. W. Moore’s  1904  review  of  Schiller’s  Humanism,  among  others,
certainly helped propagate the term. See also Bawden 1904.
42. In particular: “Experience can not without mutilation be resolved into three departments, one
cognitive or theoretical, one emotional, one practical […] It is true that what we take and what
we find we must take and find as it is given. But, on the other hand, it is also true that we do not
take – or at least do not take up – what is uninteresting; nor do we find, unless we seek, nor seek
unless we desire. The cognitive aspect of experience, in a word, is far more one of experiment, as
its very etymology suggests, than one of mere disinterested observation” (Ward, 1899: 133). Like
James, Ward began as a physiologist and psychologist, and studied under Hermann Lotze like
Royce.  In  addition  to  being  a  Voluntarist,  Ward  is  a  Leibnizian  idealist,  in  part  due  to  the
influence of Lotze – another reminder that German Idealism is a tradition with its own internal
tensions and undercurrents.
43. A fuller account of the relation between idealism and pragmatism would do well to look at
the English proponents of each side in more detail. 
44. Again, think of Peirce on “Will” as one aspect of our polar experience of effort/resistance.
45. “Hegel  made  the  question  [of  the  relations  between  our  ideals  of  conduct  and  our
acknowledgement of truth] a fundamental one in various places in his Logic” (Royce, 1904: 114).
46. And one more:  “The direction of  development  in  modern epistemology clearly  suggests,
therefore, that we may hope for a final solution of the knowledge problem only if we refuse to
separate theory from practice, only if we insist upon treating thought as an expression of will”
(Wright, 1915: 299).
47. Intriguingly, Royce’s sees support for his Absolutism in the development of non-Euclidean
geometry, as well as the mathematical logic of Peirce, Alfred Kempe, George Moore, and Bertrand
Russell. 
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48. While sometimes described as a Hegelian, Morris studied with Friedrich Trendelenburg, who
favored neo-Aristotleian idealism over Hegelian Absolutism. Hall had studied with Wundt, and
was a founder of educational psychology.
49. Dewey adds a footnote avering “The affair is even more portentous in the German with its
capital letters and series of muses.”
50. For more on this festschrift, see Friedman 2016.
51. “The  transition  to  Absolutism  is  through  (a)  the  discovery  of  the  scepticism  laten  in
voluntarism made ultimate: (b) in the demand for a community of aims or organization of wills:
(c)  the discovery that  all  recognition of  ignorance and error,  all  sceptical  doubt  involves  an
appeal to a Judger or Thought which included both the original object and the original judgment
about it” (Dewey, 1916: 250).
52. Regarding  the  intellectualism  of  the  Absolute,  Dewey’s  criticism  of  Bradley  in  “The
Intellectualist Criterion of Truth” probably expresses his view of Royce as well:  “There really
seems to be a ground for supposing that the whole argument turns on an ambiguity in the use of
the word ‘absolute.’ Keeping strictly within the limits of the argument, it means nothing more
than that thinking has a certain principle, a law of its own; that is has an appropriate mode of
procedure which must be violated […] But Mr.  Bradley immediately takes the word to mean
absolute  in  the  sense  of  describing  a  reality  which  by  its  very  nature  is  totally
contradistinguished from appearance-that is to say, from the realm of thought” (1910: 123).
53. Or  his  intellectualist  commitments  with  his  voluntarist  impulses.  Compare  Santayana’s
assessment of Royce’s system: “He wanted all minds to be one in some way which should be
logically and morally necessary, and which yet, as he could not help feeling, was morally and
logically impossible” (Santayana, 1955: 75). In a similar critical mode, Lindsay calls Royce’s view a
“[…] mystical pan-egoistic epistemology […]” combined with a “[…] rather chaotic voluntaristic
psychology […]” (Lindsay, 1918: 438). See also Flamm 2000.
54. Peirce does this in 1905’s “What Pragmatism Is” (CP 5.412).
55. Bixler (1936: 201) shares Dewey’s assessment: “If we turn to some of the early articles we find
Royce’s statements about himself confirmed with one exception that ‘voluntarism’ defines the
early  views  better  than  does  the  word  ‘pragmatism.’  Royce  does  not  seem  to  have  shared
pragmatism’s  distinctive  interest  in  the  future  or  in  the  philosophical  importance  of  other
purposes than the cognitive.”
56. This is illustrative of the tensions within the pragmatist tradition, as Anderson (2005: 471)
notes: “Thus Royce and Dewey, in quite different ways, sought to exclude each other from the
camp  of  functioning  pragmatism.  At  the  same  time,  both  men  included  Peirce  among  the
pragmatists, in part because James had identified Peirce as the originator of the movement but
also in part because they saw some strong affinities between Peirce’s thought and their own.”
57. While  this  paper  is  historical,  I  should not  fail  to  mention that  James’  “Will  to  Believe”
remains a touchstone in more recent debates about doxastic voluntarism and the ethics of belief,
even outside of pragmatist circles.
ABSTRACTS
This  paper  proposes  an  alternative  perspective  on  the  question  of  the  relationship  between
German Idealism and American Pragmatism through attention to the philosophy of Josiah Royce.
Despite being seen as a Hegelian, Royce declared himself a pragmatist. However, he also called
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his position Absolute Voluntarism. This paper suggests that the real issue between Idealism and
Pragmatism is Intellectualism vs. Voluntarism. This distinction both parallels and cuts across the
traditions  of  German  Idealism  and  American  Pragmatism,  and  promises  to  open  up  a  view
broader than the traditional accounts of the qualified appreciation of Hegel seen in Peirce and
Dewey, or the outright antipathy of James. With Peirce, we see that his continual call for Royce to
study logic includes, or complements, his criticisms that Royce neglects Secondness. Regarding
James,  we  see  his  influence  on  Royce  is  mediated  also  in  their  mutual  study  of  Wundt’s
voluntaristic psychology, which has its own roots in the pre-Kantian German Idealism of Leibniz.
As for Dewey, he acknowledges Royce’s voluntarism, but rejects Royce’s claim that his Absolute
Pragmatism/Voluntarism  is pragmatism  at  all.  Nonetheless,  even  if  Royce  failed  to  fuse  his
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